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Smith: Policing Prosecutors: What Role Can Appellate Courts Play?

POLICING PROSECUTORS: WHAT ROLE
CAN APPELLATE COURTS PLAY?
Hon. D. Brooks Smith*
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in Hofstra's seventh
legal ethics conference. I consider it a privilege to be invited. The goals
of this conference are impressive and ambitious, but let me confess that
mine is a frustrating topic. After some back and forth with Professor
Simon, we agreed upon the topic that appears in the program: the role of
appellate courts in policing prosecutorial conduct. As Professor Simon
noted to me, it "probably has not gotten much attention." He was right.
Canvassing academic literature on the subject took little more than a
nanosecond. And being forced, if you will, to think long and hard on this
topic took me back to my days as a trial judge-and to think wistfully,
even longingly, about the times when I confronted trial issues head-on.
The trial court is where issues of prosecutorial misconduct really play
out. As the Eleventh Circuit has so accurately put it: "On the matter of
professional misconduct of prosecutors, the realities require that we
defer to our colleagues on the district courts to take the lead. District
courts are in a better position to ensure that a prosecutor properly fulfills
the duties and obligations of his office."'
My pondering in recent weeks over what it is we appellate judges
do, and how we do it, has brought home to me just how limited our
powers are to actively reach out and redress certain wrongs-and in a
way that seems proportionate to the wrong itself.
Having served eighteen years on the bench of trial courts, first as a
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas judge and then as a United States
District judge, I have dealt with my share of allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct. Prior to my consignment to the judicial monastery where I
now serve, my role in addressing such allegations was exercised at the
time, or shortly after, they arose. Those of us who have labored in the

* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Remarks at Hofstra
University School of Law (Oct. 18, 2009).
1. United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 1998).
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criminal courts have seen up close the most widely-recognized forms of
prosecutorial wrongdoing: Brady violations;2 Batson violations;3
improper and inflammatory jury argument;4 and misconduct in
presenting evidence or cross-examining a defendant.5 And there are
even more egregious examples. In my preparation for today, I
catalogued at length the various types of prosecutorial wrongdoing that
have been addressed by appellate courts, just as a kind of reminder to
myself. It was a sobering exercise, akin to listening to a full-throated
sermon about original sin. 6
None of us needs to be reminded that the pressure to win-and the
pressure to satisfy a demanding public-can lead good people to
exercise poor professional judgment. And it can lead people in authority
to commit unethical and sometimes illegal acts in the name of pursuing
justice. But no judge wants to think that the process unfolding before her
or him has been infected, in any way, with ethical abuse or illegality.
Trial judges are well-positioned to address the specter of prosecutorial
wrongdoing or abuse. But my presentation is supposed to be about the
appellate role, so let me focus on that. At the risk of explicating, at
length, the obvious, let me describe the options that we appellate judges
have when confronting allegations of prosecutorial wrongdoing. The
harmless error doctrine is the elephant in the room, so I will begin by
acknowledging it.
2. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the Supreme Court concluded that a
prosecutor's withholding evidence that is favorable to a defendant and is "material either to guilt or
to punishment" violates that defendant's due process rights. Id. at 87.
3. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, the Supreme Court ruled that a
prosecutor may not peremptorily challenge "potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the
assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case
against a black defendant." Id. at 89.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Gainey, Ill F.3d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1997) (prosecutor's
comments in a drug possession case were inflammatory where he told the jury that the defendant
had the "tools of the drug trade" and that his residence was a "drug den"); United States v. Casel,
995 F.2d 1299, 1309-10 (5th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor's closing argument suggested that defendants
physically threatened the government's witnesses).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1219-25 (9th Cir. 1999) (prosecutor
engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by "forc[ing the] defendant to call a United States marshal a
liar" during cross-examination, and in eliciting a government witness's opinion on the credibility of
the defendant's extra-judicial statements).
6. Examples of prosecutorial misconduct are not uncommon. There have been federal
prosecutors instructing agents to file a false criminal complaint and affidavit, and to lie to a grand
jury. See United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 672-74 (2d Cir. 1973). There have been allegations
that a federal prosecutor authorized government agents to kidnap and torture a defendant. See
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 268-70 (2d Cir. 1974). A prosecutor has even misled a
grand jury so that members believed, incorrectly, that they could not call certain witnesses, that
other witnesses were unavailable, and that they were under abbreviated time constraints. See United
States v. Breslin, 916 F. Supp. 438, 440, 442-45 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The list is, unfortunately, lengthy.
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One of the leading cases on the doctrine of harmless error is United
States v. Hasting,7 decided in 1983. The Supreme Court had granted
certiorari "to review the reversal [by the Seventh Circuit] of
respondents' convictions because of prosecutorial allusion to their
failure to rebut the Government's evidence." 8
The underlying crimes were "particularly heinous." I point that out
only because the opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger used
precisely that term in its own application of harmless error after
reviewing the record, a review that Burger emphasized the Court
engaged in "sparingly." 9 Essentially the facts involved five men who
forcibly removed three women from a car, then raped them and
committed other brutal sexual acts. o In the pantheon of improper
prosecutorial comments, the prosecutor's argument, while improper, was
far from the worst I've heard. Here is what he said:
The defendants at no time ever challenged any of the rapes, whether or
not that occurred, any of the sodomies. They didn't challenge the
kidnapping, the fact that the girls were in East St. Louis and they were
taken across to St. Louis. They never challenged the transportation of
the victims from East St. Louis, Illinois to St. Louis, Missouri, and
they never challenged the location or whereabouts of the defendants at
all the relevant times. They want you to focus your attention on all of
the events that were before all of the crucial events of that evening.
They want to pull your focus away from the beginning of the incident
in East St. Louis after they were bumped, and then the proceeding
events. They want you to focus to the events prior to that. And you can
use your common sense and still see what that tells you.
A motion for mistrial was denied and all five men were found guilty.
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for retrial in a "terse" 2
per curiam opinion.13 In doing so, that court relied on Griffin v.
California, which proscribes prosecutorial comment on a defendant's
election not to testify.' 4 It also cited its own precedent, which held that a
Griffin error can occur even without a prosecutor commenting on the
failure of a defendant to take the stand when the "prosecutor refers to

7. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
8. Id. at 500.
9. Id. at 507, 510.
10. Id. at 501.
11. Id. at 502.
12. Id. at 503.
13. United States v. Hastings, 660 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
14. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
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testimony as uncontradicted where the defendant has elected not to
testify and when he is the only person able to dispute the testimony."1 5
Here is what the Seventh Circuit declared in the penultimate
sentence of a very brief opinion: "Despite the magnitude of the crimes
committed and the clear evidence of guilt, an application of the doctrine
of harmless error would impermissibly compromise the clear
constitutional violation of the defendants' Fifth Amendment rights."' 6
Curiously, the Seventh Circuit did not cite Chapman v. California,
a decision that had, after all, come along several years after Griffin and
which also involved prosecutorial comment on a defendant's failure to
testify in a trial.17 In Chapman, the Court rejected a per se rule that
would have required reversal where such prosecutorial comment takes
place. 18
Hasting is important on two levels. First, it reaffirmed the
robustness of the doctrine of harmless error even where a constitutional
violation of the Griffin variety has occurred. In doing so, it reminded
courts of appeals, in no uncertain terms, that "[t]he question a reviewing
court must ask is this: absent the prosecutor's allusion to the failure of
the defense to proffer evidence to rebut the testimony of the victims, is it
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a
verdict of guilty?"l 9
Second, what is every bit as important in the Supreme Court's
decision was its "assumption" that the Seventh Circuit, sub silentio,
"was exercising its supervisory powers to discipline the prosecutors of
its jurisdiction."2 0 The Supreme Court therefore posed the question of
"whether, on this record, in a purported exercise of supervisory powers,
a reviewing court may ignore the harmless error analysis of
Chapman."2 1 The Court answered the question by holding that the
harmless error rule of Chapman "may not be avoided by an assertion of
supervisory power, simply to justify a reversal of these criminal
convictions." 22 The Court's reasoning was three-pronged:
Supervisory power to reverse a conviction is not needed as a remedy
when the error to which it is addressed is harmless since, by definition,
the conviction would have been obtained notwithstanding the asserted
15.
1978)).
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Hastings, 660 F.2d at 303 (quoting United States v. Buege, 578 F.2d 187, 188 (7th Cir.
Id.
386 U.S. 18, 19 (1967).
Id. at 21-22.
Hasting,461 U.S. at 510-11.
Id. at 505.
Id.
Id.
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error. Further, in this context, the integrity of the process carries less
weight, for it is the essence of the harmless-error doctrine that a
judgment may stand only when there is no "reasonable possibility that
the [practice] complained of might have contributed to the
conviction." 23
And finally, the Court emphasized that "deterrence is an
inappropriate basis for reversal where, as here, the prosecutor's remark
is at most an attenuated violation of Griffin and where means more
narrowly tailored to deter objectionable prosecutorial conduct are
available." 2 4
The nature of harmless error review and concomitant limitations on
our supervisory authority profoundly limit the reach of a court of appeals
when it confronts most claims of prosecutorial misconduct. But we as
court of appeals judges do have a role to play in policing the work of
prosecutors. And it is not an insignificant one.
Last year, a panel of my own court reversed and remanded a case
where "the government's repeated injection of prejudicial drug evidence
into the trial testimony constituted prosecutorial misconduct resulting in
a denial of due process." 25 Notwithstanding the lack of objection, we
concluded that the district court had indeed committed plain error by
allowing the introduction of prejudicial drug evidence.26
The opinion described the Government's trial conduct as having
"repeatedly exceeded its pretrial proffer, [by] systematically injecting
inadmissible drug evidence into the . . . trial."2 7 The Government, on
numerous occasions, introduced prejudicial drug evidence with no
proper purpose under Rule of Evidence 404(b). 28 The district court
issued at least five warnings, but failed to prevent what the panel opinion
referred to as "the rampant injection of inadmissible evidence into the
trial." 2 9 Indeed, the district court provided only a single limiting
instruction that was simply not enough to cure the prejudice.30
Ultimately, Judge Aldisert's opinion held that the Government's
evidence against the defendant "was not sufficient to overcome the
prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's misconduct." 3 ' And he put a
23.
(1963)).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 506 (alteration in original) (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87
Id. (footnote omitted).
United States v. Morena, 547 F.3d 191, 193 (3d Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 196.
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gloss on harmless error review that is important for our purposes.
Relying on a prior Third Circuit decision,3 1 Judge Aldisert explained
that "even 'finding the evidence more than sufficient for conviction does
not necessarily end the constitutional inquiry.' The reviewing court must
always factor the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's impropriety into
the jury's finding of guilt and then assess its impact."3 3
The simple lesson from Morena is, of course, that harmless error is
not such an insurmountable hurdle as to doom all efforts of defendants
to demonstrate that prosecutorial misconduct "so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." 34
To be sure, not every instance of prosecutorial misconduct is
subject to harmless error review. Brady violations are not, because they
require a showing of materiality. 35 Evidence is material if there is a
reasonable probability that pretrial disclosure would have produced a
different result at trial.36 But here again, courts have said that "'weighing
of the evidence merits deference from the Court of Appeals, especially
given the difficulty inherent in measuring the effect of a non-disclosure
on the course of a lengthy trial covering many witnesses and
exhibits. "',3

But if harmless error review effectively limits the range of
sanctioning options for prosecutorial misconduct in most cases, what
other sanctions are available to courts of appeals? After all, state
prosecutors acting within the scope of their authority in initiating and
pursuing a criminal prosecution are immune from liability in suits under
section 1983. In upholding that immunity in Imbler v. Pachtman, the
Supreme Court hastened to assure the public that it was not "powerless
to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs." 39 Justice Powell's
opinion for the Court included the reminder that "[e]ven judges" can be
punished for the willful deprivation of constitutional rights under 18
U.S.C. § 242, and that prosecutors "would fare no better." 4 0 But this
seems small comfort to an appeals court that confronts prosecutorial
wrongdoing, the lion's share of which does not rise to the level of a
criminal offense.
32. Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 112 (3d Cir. 2001).
33. Morena, 547 F.3d at 197 (quoting Moore, 255 F.3d at 112 (citation omitted)).
34. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974).
35. Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869-70 (2006).
36. See id.
37. United States v. Thornton, I F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v.
Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted)).
38. Id. at 429.
39. Id. at 429.
40. Id.
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The Supreme Court has had occasion to remind us since its 1983
Hasting decision that federal courts may not exercise their supervisory
authority to dismiss an indictment for errors in a grand jury proceeding.
In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 4 1 the Court concluded that even
where the Government committed multiple violations of Rule 6 and had
engaged in inappropriate conduct at other points during the grand jury
trial, such "isolated episodes in the course of a 20-month
investigation .

. .

. d[id] not, even when considered cumulatively, raise a

substantial question, much less a grave doubt, as to whether they had a
substantial effect on the grand jury's decision to charge."42
However, the Court did suggest that there were other means of
remedying this sort of wrongdoing. It pointed to language in Rule 6
providing for holding an individual in contempt of court and also
instructed that a court "may direct a prosecutor to show cause why he
should not be disciplined and request the bar or the Department of
Justice to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him."4 3 The opinion
also recommended chastising prosecutors in written opinions.44
Indeed, one of my colleagues from the First Circuit, Judge Selya,
reminds us in one of his opinions that "[c]ourts have many other
weapons in their armamentarium."4 5 This is good news (although I must
confess that I had never heard of an "armamentarium" until reading his
opinion). The First Circuit in United States v. Horn46 was called upon to
decide if "principles of sovereign immunity bar a federal district court,
exercising its supervisory power, from assessing attorneys' fees and
costs against the federal government in a criminal case." 47 The Court
held that sovereign immunity trumped supervisory authority, thereby
striking down a district court order directing the government to pay fees
and costs incurred in litigating the misconduct issue presented by a
prosecutor's "unpardonable misconduct," as Judge Selya characterized
it. 4 8 But the opinion otherwise approved the District Court's order which
had directed "the removal and quarantine of the lead prosecutor, the
suppression of tainted documents, and the advance disclosure of the
government's trial strategy." 4 9 The First Circuit also noted approvingly

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

487 U.S. 250 (1988).
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 766 (1st Cir. 1994).
29 F.3d 754 (1st Cir. 1994).
Id. at 757.
Id.
Id. at 766.
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that the District Court had referred the lead prosecutor to the disciplinary
committees of her two bar associations.o
If you are of the view that a remedy short of reversal is an
inadequate response to egregious prosecutorial misconduct, then you
will regard a court's decision to criticize by name an errant prosecutor in
a published opinion as a mere slap on the wrist. It is, nonetheless, one
option available to an appellate court. Perhaps I am naive, but I believe
that the overwhelming majority of prosecutors would recoil at the notion
of her or his name being publicly linked to what is, quite plainly, legal
wrong-doing. Judicial opprobrium directed against a lawyer on ethical
grounds is not the stuff of which successful careers are normally builtat least not in the prosecutorial realm.
One interesting footnote to the First Circuit's Horn opinion: the
district court deliberately deleted the prosecutor's name from its order
prior to publication so as not to cause the prosecutor public
humiliation. 1 Judge Selya wrote: "Although we, if writing on a pristine
page, might not be so solicitous, we honor the district court's exercise of
its discretion, mindful that its choice has substantive implications."S2
On occasion-and fortunately they are rare-we are confronted
with prosecutorial misconduct which is committed during the course of
an appeal. In United States v. Williams,53 the defendant-appellant was
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a drug and firearm
prosecution. The D.C. Circuit was presented with a Government brief
which contained "five material misstatements of the record." 55 In a per
curiam opinion which affirmed the conviction, the Court condemned the
misstatements as "irresponsibly careless at best or deliberately
misleading at worst." 5 6 And underscoring the obligations of the U.S.
Attorney as "'the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty,'" 57 the Court lamented: "That the
Government made these misstatements renders the conduct here even
more egregious."
That is as far as it went. While acknowledging that the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure authorize the imposition of sanctions, the
D.C. Circuit refused to pull the trigger: "We do not wish to penalize the
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 759.
Id. at 758 n.I.
Id.
952 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 419.
Id. at 421.
Id.
Id. (quoting Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 803 (1987)).
Id.
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inexperienced author of the misstatements, beyond this public
reprimand, in view of the factual complexity of the case and the failure
of the U.S. Attorney's Office adequately to involve trial counsel in the
supervision of the case on appeal."59
Recently, a panel on which I sat tried to make sense of the
submissions from a state prosecutor in a habeas action that was before
us. 60 The petitioner was one of three original defendants charged in a
double homicide that arose out of a drug deal. 6 1 The alleged role of the
petitioner in the underlying crimes was significantly different from the
other two defendants, and this was of enormous importance to us in that
the only real issue before us was sufficiency of the evidence. 62 But the
prosecution, in its brief and citations to the record, continually
referenced the three actors together as "defendants." 6 3 Indeed, several of
the references pertained only to the other two defendants.6 4 In our
opinion, we included a footnote which denounced the state's references
as "both unhelpful and misleading," and we further castigated counsel
by declaring that they had "consistently either misunderstood or ignored
the limitations and propriety of including such . .. [references in]

responding to [the petitioner's] appeal."65 Whatever sting may come
from that language may have seemed minor, though, even to the
prosecutors, because the state lost on the merits and habeas relief was
granted.
Before I conclude these remarks, let me leave the fertile field of
actual misconduct by prosecutors and stray into the realm of policy.
After all, "Policing Prosecutors" is billed as my topic. I am no
etymologist, but even a beginning Latin student would recognize that
"police" and "policy" share the same root. Is it ever the role of an
appellate judge to question the exercise of prosecutorial discretion? I do
not suggest by the inquiry that it is our role to intrude upon such exercise
by judicial fiat. But is it ever appropriate for an appellate court, or an
appellate judge writing a separate opinion, to opine on or criticize a
prosecutorial action that is policy-based but not legally infirm?
In 2004, the case of United States v. Bonner66 was decided by a
panel of which I was a part. Bonner had fled from police after the car in
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 422.
Kamienski v. Hendricks, 332 F. App'x 740, 740 (3d Cir. 2009).
See id. at 741.
See id. at 742-43 (describing Kamienski's role in the crimes).
Id. at 744 n.9.
Id.
Id.
363 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2004).
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which he was a passenger was subject to a routine traffic stop. 6 7 The
police chased him, and upon apprehending him, discovered crack
cocaine in his possession.68 Although I concurred in upholding the stop
and the search that followed, I joined my colleague Judge McKee in the
last section of his dissent which described what he called a "troubling
aspect of this case."6 You see, a prosecution against Bonner on drug
charges was first filed in state court. 70 In the Pennsylvania trial court, he
moved to suppress the physical evidence seized from him upon arrest. 7 1
After a hearing, the state court judge agreed with Bonner that the police
lacked reasonable suspicion, basing that ruling upon the Pennsylvania
Constitution.7 2 State prosecutors appealed, but apparently they were not
content to wait for a ruling because Bonner was soon indicted by a
federal grand jury on federal charges. The state court appeal was
withdrawn, federal prosecutors took over, and the rest is history.
As Judge McKee conceded: "[W]e have jurisdiction here and must
exercise it . . ..
But both he and I felt impelled to write separately, on
a non-merits issue-some might say "gratuitously"-to express our
concern "for the appearance of fairness."
Here is what I wrote, in a separate opinion in Bonner:
It should be a rare occasion when judges criticize, and thereby
intrude into, a legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Nor
should we routinely question in our opinions the policy decisions of
Congress to federalize what has traditionally been state law street
crime. Our institutional role as judges is limited by our jurisdiction and
by the comity and respect we owe to coordinate branches of
government.
That being said, the instant case presents a series of events which
the dissent characterizes as a prosecutorial "switcheroo." I cannot
disagree with that characterization, and I share the "concern for the
appearance of fairness" expressed by Judge McKee. It is one thing for
the government to assume an investigation initiated by state law
enforcement officials, or even to adopt a prosecution commenced by
67. Id. at 215.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 228 (McKee, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 229.
75. Id.; see also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("But to perform its high function
in the best way, 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."' (quoting Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954))).
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state prosecutors. It is quite another to seek a federal indictment where
the federal interest in the case is recognized only after state prosecutors
have given the case their best shot in the state courts and lost on an
issue of state law. Not only does such a tactic offend fundamental
notions of fairness, it is contrary to traditional notions of our
federalism. 76
Was this a proper exercise of our role? Was it any of our business?
I hope that in the discussion that follows you will tell me. One of my
former law clerks, then in the U.S. Attorney's office, let me know his
views-in a satirical poem he composed and read a few years later at a
gathering of my former clerks. The relevant verse goes like this:
His opinions are crisp, and his language precise.
His logic is stunning, his word choice concise.
His decisions are praised with a steadfast recurrence,
with just one exception, that Bonner concurrence.
My thanks to Professor Simon and Hofstra University School of
Law for the invitation, and to all of you for your attention.

76. Id. at 219-20 (Smith, J., concurring).
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